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ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING 
INFLAMMOTORY AND IRRELEVENT EVIDENCE REGARDING 
HUNTER'S PARTICIPATION IN A WHITE SUPREMECIST 
PRISON GANG 
The State first claims that Hunter's trial counsel's repeated objections to 
references that he was a member of a white supremacist prison gang failed to preserve the 
Rule 404(b) issue because the objections were based on relevance and not verbally linked 
to Rule 404(b) (Br. of App. at 10). The State misses the crux of the claim: while 
evidence that Hunter belonged to a gang may have been admissible to help the jury 
understand why the deceased was beaten and subsequently killed, evidence that Hunter 
was a member of a white supremacist prison gang called Silent Aryan Warrior was 
inadmissible under the Rules of Evidence because it was completely irrelevant and highly 
inflammatory and it was only introduced to show that Hunter had a propensity to commit 
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crime. Moreover, "When analyzing the admissibility of bad-acts evidence, the trial court 
must determine '(1) whether the evidence is being offered for a proper, non- character 
purpose under rule 404(b), (2) whether such e\idence meets the requirements of rule 402, 
and (3) whether the evidence meets the requirement of rule 403.'" State v. Rees, 2004 UT 
App 51, T[2, 88 P.3d 359 (quoting State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^ |20, 993 P.2d 837, cert 
denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S.Ct. 1181, 145 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2002)). 
The State further claims that because the objections were not specifically stated, 
the only remedy left is plain error (Br. of App, at 11). Hunter asserts that this claim was 
made with specificity as the question of relevancy and probative value of evidence is at 
the heart of the analysis concerning the admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts. See 
Rees, Decorso supra. 
The State next claims that this remedy is also not available because Hunter failed 
to object to the highly inflammatory evidence during opening statements and closing 
arguments by both the State and the co-defendant, thereby waiving any plain error claim 
because this "foreclosed the trial court's opportunity to cure an alleged error" (Br. of 
App. at 11-14). However, counsel's statements at the opening and closing of trial 
constitute argument and not evidence. Although trial counsel failed to object during 
opening statements, timely objections were raised during trial when the evidence was 
presented and these objections were overruled by the trial court (R. 224: 155-63). These 
objections gave the trial court sufficient opportunity to correct error and to admonish the 
jury not to consider the fact that Hunter was involved in a white supremacist prison gang. 
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The State lastly claims that even if this issue was not waived, it fails under the 
plain error standard since there was no danger the probative value of the evidence was 
"substantially outweighed" by Rule 403 concerns (Br. of App. at 15). The State then 
cites to State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988), in order to determine 
whether the probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
Shickles lists a variety of factors that may be relevant in determining whether 
evidence is inadmissible due the danger of unfair prejudice. One such factor is strength 
of the evidence. The State's claim that the evidence against Hunter "was quite strong" is 
inaccurate (Br. of App. at 20). As shown in the original brief, the State's main witness— 
and good friend of the deceased—testified that Hunter did not "take any part in any of it" 
(R. 223: 90). The only two witnesses that laid any blame on Hunter were unreliable at 
best, considering their rampant methamphetamine use, prior history of lying, and not 
being charged for their admitted participation in the crime (R. 223: 197, 211; 224: 149, 
175,211). 
While factors regarding the strength of evidence, the need for the evidence, and 
other factors listed in Shickles regarding the admissibility of evidence are relevant, the 
most pertinent query for this case is "the degree to which the evidence probably will 
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295-96 (citation omitted). 
As explained above and in Appellant's original brief, evidence of participation in a gang 
may have been relevant, but evidence that Hunter was a member of a white supremacist 
prison gang was inadmissible because of its highly inflammatory nature and likelihood to 
inflame the jury against him. Letting the jury know that Hunter was a member of a white 
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supremacist prison gang certainly conjured images in the jurors' minds of extremist white 
men with shaven heads terrorizing innocent minorities. Moreover, these groups are often 
associated with Hitler and Nazism. Thus this evidence would inflame any reasonable 
jury and incite overmastering hostility toward any defendant. Accordingly, the evidence 
should have been excluded. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Hunter asks 
this Court to reverse his convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of May, 2004. 
Margaret Lindsay O^ 
Counsel for Appellant 
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